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Raising Rivals’ Fixed Costs
MORTEN HVIID and MATTHEW OLCZAK
ABSTRACT This article demonstrates that raising fixed costs can serve as a credible
mechanism for a well placed firm to exclude its rivals. We identify a number of
credible avenues, such as increased regulation, vexatious litigation and increased prices
for essential inputs, through which such a firm can raise fixed costs. We show that for
a wide range of oligopoly models this may be a profitable strategy, even if the firm’s
own fixed costs are affected as much (or even more) than its rivals and even if it is
less efficient. The resulting reduction in the number of firms in the market is
detrimental to consumer welfare and hence worthy of scrutiny by competition and
regulatory authorities.
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1. Introduction
Lately the application of the label “raising rivals’ costs” (RRC) to strategic
behaviour has been widened considerably to cover most of the monopolisation
strategies dealt with in the US under section of the Sherman Act and the
exclusionary abuses dealt with in the EU under the abuse of dominance
(Article 102TFEU). This follows a recognition that the effect of most
exclusionary strategies is to raise costs of rivals or potential rivals. Because
these strategies force them to look elsewhere for inputs or outlets for their
products, they become less competitive and in extreme cases choose to exit or
not to enter the market.
Competition policy has largely been focused on strategies such as
exclusionary conduct or margin squeezes, which aim to raise rivals’ marginal
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costs. This is in line with the economics literature that generally gives marginal
costs pre-eminence above fixed costs since these directly affect firms incentives
regarding pricing and output decisions. In line with this, much of the
traditional theoretical literature on RRC (see the section on related literature)
has focused on variable costs with essential input prices and regulation, the
two long-standing examples of means through which costs can be raised. We
argue that in both of these cases such strategies may often predominantly
affect fixed costs. Furthermore, we outline a range of other ways in which a
firm could raise the fixed costs of all firms within the industry.
This paper is the first to formally establish the anti-competitive effects of
such a fixed-cost-raising strategy within a fully specified oligopolistic
framework. Recalling that fixed costs affect the participation constraint of a
firm when these costs are not incurred if the firm exits the industry,1 we
demonstrate that in a wide range of oligopoly models raising fixed costs can
serve as a credible mechanism for a well placed firm to exclude its rivals.
This can be achieved by either forcing a rival to exit the market or by
deterring a rival’s entry; henceforth, we will use “exclusion” to refer to
either case. Our findings generalise the insights which can be gained from
considering the strategic raising of fixed costs in the model by Dasgutpa
and Stiglitz (1988), who consider entry under homogenous Bertrand
competition when fixed costs are present, although not as a result of
strategic behaviour.
We show that raising fixed costs can be a profitable strategy for a firm even
if its fixed costs are affected as much as (or even more than) its rivals. This is
in contrast to strategies that increase variable costs which, typically, are not
profitable if the strategy raises the firm’s own costs by at least as much as its
rivals (see Mason, 2002). In addition, we show that the perpetrator of a fixed-
cost-raising strategy can be less efficient than its excluded rivals and we
consider the possibility that its beneficial position may arise from a first-mover
advantage in its output decision.
From a policy perspective the main message of this article is that many
cost-raising strategies, even if they do not affect marginal costs, can have
significant anti-competitive effects and be detrimental to consumer welfare;
hence, the nature of the costs cannot be used as a filter to determine which
cost-raising strategies should be subject to scrutiny by competition and
regulatory authorities.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In the second section
we summarise the related literature and highlight a range of examples of ways
in which firms could raise fixed costs. In the third section we present our
general model which provides a general sufficient condition for a fixed-
cost-raising strategy to be profitable and develops a number of implications
from this. In the fourth section we apply the general model to a number of
specific oligopoly models. This allows us to further illustrate the range of
levels of the fixed costs for which raising fixed costs is a profitable strategy
and to extend the analysis by allowing for the firm that raises fixed costs to
have higher marginal costs and to have a first-mover advantage in the product
market. Finally, we conclude the paper with a discussion on the welfare and
policy implications of the analysis.
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2. Related Literature
The traditional theoretical literature on RRC has focused on raising variable
costs. Williamson (1968) provided one of the earliest examples of a RRC
strategy. This was based on raising the costs of essential inputs and more
specifically concerned the negotiation of higher wages for key personnel. As
discussed in Appendix 1, this was motivated by a case brought against a US
mining firm; however, it was not until Salop and Scheffman (1983, 1987) that
the first formal model of RRC emerged. They argued that, unlike predation, a
strategy of raising rivals’ variable costs was more credible, did not require the
rival to exit the market and allowed short-run gains. Their model used a
dominant firm, competitive fringe set-up to show how this strategic RRC could
be achieved. It showed that an RRC strategy is profitable if the increase in
costs leads to an increase in the dominant firm’s residual demand which
exceeds the shift in its average cost curve. They showed that this may have a
negative or a positive effect on the fringe’s profit and on consumer welfare.
They then applied their model to a number of settings, in particular to raising
the cost of an essential input.
Oster (1982) was the first to formalise the idea that a firm might be able to
use regulation strategically to raise variable costs. She offered the example of
US brand name drug producers in the 1970s lobbying for regulation to
disadvantage generic producers. An extensive and well established literature
on lobbying for regulation followed; see, for example, Michaelis (1994), where
two political parties compete for campaign contributions from firms that are
subject to regulation.
In Appendix 1 we discuss further these two classic examples of using
essential input prices and regulation as means to RRC. We argue that in both
cases such strategies will often predominantly affect fixed rather than variable
costs. In addition, we add a further three ways in which one firm can raise the
fixed costs of all firms in the industry. These are, firstly, vexatious litigation
where the primary aim is to disadvantage the defendant rather than right a
wrong, secondly, situations such as slotting allowances and land banks of
retail sites where there is competition for capacity and finally, the use of
advertising to blur the message of a rival. As discussed in the appendix, these
strategies also predominantly affect fixed costs and, taken together, all five
cover a significant range of sectors of the economy. The fact that their impact
is predominantly on fixed costs means that these examples do not fit well with
the previous RRC literature described above.
A number of previous papers have focused on the impact of fixed costs on
competition. Firstly, Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1988) consider sequential entry
decisions in a homogeneous goods Bertrand model in the presence of fixed
costs. They show that with any positive level of fixed costs (not necessarily
resulting from strategic behaviour) the outcome is a monopoly. In the section
on Bertrand competition with homogenous products, we relate this specific
setting to our general model with fixed costs arising from strategic behaviour.
Secondly, Rogerson (1984) uses a simple example to show that where entrants
are non-strategic “quantity takers”, an incumbent with a first-mover advantage
can profitably deter entry by raising fixed costs. Finally, McChesney (1997)
uncovers industry preferences for regulation, which raises the fixed costs by
considering aggregate supply functions rather than strategic firm behaviour.
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The aggregate supply function shifts up and left when an increase in fixed
costs causes a reduction in the number of firms and therefore the market
clearing price will increase. The resulting gain in profit may be sufficient to
compensate for the increase in fixed costs. In contrast to our paper, none of
these contributions model the individual incentives of firms, nor the
mechanism through which a cost-raising strategy could have the desired effect.
3. General Model
In our general model we will allow for an endogenously determined number
of symmetric firms to compete under a wide range of oligopoly models
including Cournot competition and Bertrand competition with differentiated
goods. This allows us to derive a general sufficient condition for a “raising
fixed costs” strategy to be profitable. In the fourth section we focus on
Bertrand competition with homogenous products and Cournot duopoly
competition. This allows us to further illustrate the scope for fixed-cost-raising
strategies and to extend the analysis by allowing for asymmetry between firms
in marginal costs and through sequential moves in output decisions.
3.1. Set-up and Assumptions
Whilst firms are initially otherwise identical, we assume that one (henceforth
denoted firm 1) of the firms has the ability to take an action which raises the
fixed costs of all firms before they simultaneously make their pricing or output
decisions. As the examples in Appendix illustrate, there are several ways in
which a firm can find itself in this position. The obvious cases are where a
single firm faces one or more potential entrants. In other cases, the opportunity
to engage in cost-raising behaviour may be limited to a specific firm or firms.
One example is lobbying where one might reasonably think that domestic
firms have a strong advantage. This may also arise through design, for
example in planning patent thickets with vexatious litigation in mind. Such
advantages can also arise from idiosyncrasies in the market, for example from
the way supermarkets structure a sequential set of auctions for shelf space.
Finally, the opportunity to raise costs may arise purely fortuitously, for
example a firm’s patent portfolio may also serendipitously facilitate vexatious
litigation.
In addition, in keeping with the examples discussed in detail in Appendix 1,
we make a number of further assumptions. Firstly, the fixed costs are all
avoidable for a firm which decides not to produce, and the source of the increase
in fixed costs is common knowledge. Secondly, the action is initially assumed to
raise all firms’ fixed costs equally and the resulting magnitude of the increase is
common knowledge. In the section on asymmetric impact of the action on fixed
costs, we allow for firms’ fixed costs to be affected differently and for uncertainty
over the exact impact the action will have on fixed costs.
We will denote the strategy space of firm i in the underlying competition
games as Si, which we assume is independent of the number of firms (n), and
denote a pure strategy for firm i as si 2 Si. We will then refer to all firms other
than some given firm i as i and use si to denote the vector of all firms’
strategies other than firm i. Firm i’s profits are then pi si; sið Þ. For firm i a
strategy si is the best response to si (denoted si ðsiÞ) if piðsi; siÞ > piðs0i; siÞ for
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all s0i 2 Si. Standard conditions then ensure that there exists a unique Nash
equilibrium in the pure strategies of the underlying competition game between
n firms and the resulting equilibrium strategies will be denoted as si ðnÞ, where
piðsi ðnÞ; siðnÞÞ piðsiðnÞ; siðnÞÞ for all si 2 Si.
3.2. A Profitable “Raising Fixed Costs” Strategy
Define the base line fixed costs, F, as the level of fixed costs in the absence of
any cost-raising strategies. The level of F will determine the maximum number
of firms which could be accommodated in the industry and we assume that
F > 0.2 It follows that there must be an endogenous maximal number of firms,
n, that can be in the industry even if fixed costs remain unchanged. Let p nð Þ
be the resulting per-firm gross profit before fixed costs (i.e.
pðnÞ ¼ piðsi ðnÞ; siðnÞ). To simplify notation, we will assume that if a firm is
indifferent between whether or not to produce, it will opt not to do so. We are
interested in determining when it is profitable for firm 1 to take the action to
raise fixed costs. Initially, we will assume that the action results in a specific
level of fixed costs and in Proposition 1 provide a general sufficient condition
for firm 1 to then profit from taking the action. We then allow for the impact
of the action to be either endogenously or exogenously determined.
Proposition 1. Consider a market with base line fixed costs F > 0 and n firms. As
long as it subsequently remains in the market, a sufficient condition for firm 1 to
profit from taking an action which raises fixed costs just high enough such that the
equilibrium with n firms is no longer viable and one firm is excluded, is that per-firm
profits, p nð Þ, are convex in the number of firms.
Proof. Assume free entry and define n as above. In this case F p n þ 1ð Þ, hence
the following inequality relating to current profits of p nð Þ  Fmust hold:
0\p nð Þ  F p nð Þ  p n þ 1ð Þ: (1)
If firm 1 could take an action which increases fixed costs to F^ðnÞ ¼ pðnÞ to
drive out one further firm, profits would be given by
p n  1ð Þ  F^ðnÞ ¼ p n  1ð Þ  p nð Þ:
From equation (1) a sufficient (but not necessary) condition for this to be
profitable is that
p n  1ð Þ  p nð Þ[ p nð Þ  p n þ 1ð Þ;
which we can write as
1
2
p n  1ð Þ þ p n þ 1ð Þ½ [ p nð Þ:
This is exactly the condition for p nð Þ to be convex. Therefore, a sufficient
condition for excluding a rival when 1 is that pðnÞ is convex. h
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For the majority of oligopoly models, per-firm profits are a convex function
of the number of firms. This is, for example, true for all Cournot models and,
as demonstrated in Appendix 2, for differentiated goods Bertrand models. The
intuition is simple; essentially, when one more firm is added two things
happen to the per-firm profits. Firstly, there are more firms sharing the total
profits and secondly, with more firms, competition is more intense and hence
the total profits are also decreased.
The precise implication of Proposition 1 depends upon a number of factors
which will be addressed in turn in the subsequent subsections.
3.3. Endogenous or Exogenous Increase in Fixed Costs
Firstly, note that for n > 2, Proposition 1 (with base line fixed costs replaced
by F ¼ F^ðn  1Þ) continues to apply to further reductions in the number of
firms below n  1. It then crucially matters whether the size of the increase in
fixed costs arising from a cost-raising strategy is endogenously or exogenously
determined.
Corollary 1. Where the size of the increase in fixed costs is completely endogenous,
firm 1 would choose to raise fixed costs to the lowest level of F such that
p 2ð Þ  F F ¼ 0.
In other words, fixed costs would be raised all the way to the point where
only one firm remains active.
Corollary 2. If the size of the increase in fixed costs is endogenous, but has an
upper bound at F where pðrÞ\Fþ F\pðr 1Þ and 1\r\n, total fixed costs
would be raised to pðrÞ and no further.
Here, fixed costs are raised such that as many firms as possible are
excluded, with the fixed cost set so as to just exclude the marginal firm,
similar to the following corollary.
Corollary 3. If the amount by which fixed costs can be raised is exogenous and results
in total fixed costs of Fe where pðrÞ, firm 1 would take the action to raise fixed costs if
and only if Fe > FðnÞ where FðnÞ is the level of fixed costs such that
FðnÞ  piðsi ðr 1Þ; siðr 1ÞÞ  piðsi ðnÞ; siðnÞÞ.
In other words, firm 1 would take the action to raise fixed costs to this level
unless this is so costly that it removes the gains from excluding a rival. In the
latter case firm 1 prefers the Nash equilibrium with n firms and base line
fixed costs. In the section on symmetric duopoly Cournot competition we
compare Fð2Þ to F^ ¼ pð2Þ.
3.4. Asymmetric Impact of the Action on Fixed Costs
We initially assumed that all firms’ fixed costs were raised equally; however,
it also follows that the incentive to raise fixed costs may still exist even if
the firm’s own fixed costs rise more than its rivals, either because the action
affects the firms differently or due to an additional cost involved in taking
the action. To see this, using subscripts to distinguish between firm 1 and its
rivals’ j 6¼ 1, it follows from Proposition 1 that firm 1 can exclude a rival if
24 M. Hviid and M. Olczak
F^ðnÞ Fj where F^ðnÞ ¼ pjðsj ðnÞ; sjðnÞÞ. This is profitable for firm 1 as long as
the action raises its own fixed costs such that F1 FðnÞ where
FðnÞ ¼ p1ðs1ðn 1Þ; s1ðn 1ÞÞ  p1ðs1ðnÞ; s1ðnÞÞ, and this allows for the
possibility that F^ðnÞ Fj. Furthermore, this range also allows for some degree
of uncertainty over the exact impact the action will have on fixed costs, for
example the final cost of the vexatious litigation.
3.5. Raising F as a Credible Commitment to Remain in the Industry – Forward
Induction
Crucial to Proposition 1 is the assumption that the firm that takes the action to
raise fixed costs will remain in the industry. If firm 1 believes that raising fixed
costs is followed by the exclusion of a rival, then raising fixed costs is optimal;
however, if firm 1 believes that raising fixed costs is followed by any other
equilibrium in the competition subgame then it would prefer to not take this
action. This establishes that there is a multiplicity of subgame perfect
equilibria.
As is well known, subgame perfection is not always a sufficiently strong
equilibrium refinement to rule out all implausible equilibria. Note that the
equilibrium with no cost-raising is based on firm 1’s belief that all its rivals
would respond to firm 1 raising costs by still choosing to produce; however,
its rivals would only ever do this if they believed that firm 1 would follow
raising costs by exiting the market. Such beliefs do not seem sensible, but
subgame perfection does not rule out irrational beliefs. To do so we need to
employ the reasoning behind forward induction.
Forward induction requires a firm to rationalise a prior move of a rival.
Let the action be raising fixed costs to pðrÞ F. In this case, firm 1’s rivals
must consider what could have motivated firm 1 and what subsequent move
by firm 1 could make that action rational. In this case, firm 1’s rivals can
only rationalise the strategic choice of a higher F by firm 1 choosing s1ðr 1Þ.
More formally, we can refine the set of equilibria using forward induction. If
firm 1 intended to follow raising fixed costs by exiting, it would have done
better by not taking the action and instead choosing s1ðrÞ, as pðrÞ  F > 0.
This leaves firm 1’s rivals with only one possible inference from observing
firm 1 taking the action to raise fixed costs, namely that firm 1 plans to
choose s1ðr 1Þ and in this case the best reply is for one of firm 1’s rivals to
exit. Given the beliefs of firm 1’s rivals, firm 1’s choice is between not taking
the action to raise fixed costs, leading to profits of pðrÞ  F, and raising
rivals’ fixed costs, leading to it earning pðr 1Þ  pðrÞ. From Proposition 1 the
optimal choice for firm 1 is therefore to raise fixed costs.
The benefit of using forward induction is that it directly focuses on the
inference that firm 1’s rivals may make from observing the behaviour of
firm 1. The key insight is that a “raising fixed costs” strategy makes no
sense, unless the firm which does so also plans to exclude rivals from the
market. We can think of firm 1’s choice to raise the rivals’ costs as including
a communication about its strategy in the competition subgame.3 The
inferences and resulting actions are clearest when firm 1 is raising fixed costs
to exclude a single rival and thus monopolise the market; however, it also
applies more generally for n > 2 where raising fixed costs provides the
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commitment that firm 1 will remain in the market and at least one of its
rivals is excluded, albeit with the potential for coordination issues over
which rival this will be.
3.6. Exclusion at a Lower Level of F
Finally, in Proposition 1, firm 1 needs to raise F^ to pðnÞ to exclude a rival;
however, in certain settings it may not be necessary to raise fixed costs so
high. This is because, as outlined earlier, under forward induction by raising
fixed costs firm 1 can credibly commit to choosing s1ðn  1Þ; however, note
that this means that one of firm 1’s rivals will be excluded from the market if
F ¼ piðsi ðn  1Þ; siðsi ðn  1ÞÞÞ . As we will illustrate in the next section, since
under Cournot competition firms’ strategies in the competition subgame are
strategic substitutes, this level of F will be below4 F^ ¼ pðnÞ.
Overall, combining Proposition 1 with the above discussion of forward
induction, a firm with the ability to raise fixed costs both for itself and its rival
would have an incentive to do so for a certain range of resultant levels of fixed
costs. If firm 1 could choose not just to raise fixed costs, but also to set the
level, then it would raise them just sufficiently enough to enable it to
monopolise the market.
4. Application to Specific Oligopoly Models
In this section we will apply the general model developed earlier to several
specific oligopoly models. The last three subsections of this section will consider
Cournot duopoly competition. This allows us to illustrate the range of levels of
fixed costs for which raising the fixed costs is a profitable strategy and to extend
the analysis by allowing for the firm that raises fixed costs to have higher
marginal costs and a first-mover advantage in the product market. Before that,
we briefly consider Bertrand competition with homogenous products and
describe how high a firm would be willing to raise fixed costs in this setting.
4.1. Bertrand Competition with Homogenous Products
The analysis of this case follows directly from interpreting the fixed costs in
the Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1988) model described in section on related
literature as being strategically determined. Here, from the results of our
general model, firm 1 will be willing to raise fixed costs to high levels since
competition is otherwise so intense. More specifically, with n 2 and F ¼ 0,
pi pi ðnÞ; piðnÞ
  ¼ 0 and it follows that Fð2Þ is equal to the monopoly profits.
Therefore, using the above forward induction argument, firm 1 would want to
raise fixed costs as long as these remain below this level.
4.2. Symmetric Duopoly Cournot Competition
In the section on the general model we showed that in a wide range of
oligopoly models raising fixed costs just sufficiently so that a rival is excluded
is a profitable strategy. Consider symmetric Cournot duopoly competition with
base line fixed costs (0 F) where qc is the symmetric Cournot duopoly
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equilibrium output. Here, following the earlier analysis, it will certainly be
profitable for firm 1 to raise fixed costs to F^ð2Þ ¼ pi qc; qcð Þ and exclude firm 2.
In this subsection we examine symmetric duopoly Cournot competition further
to consider the range of levels of fixed costs for which raising fixed costs is a
profitable strategy. More specifically, how far below F^ð2Þ will it be possible for
firm 1 to exclude firm 2 and how far above F^ð2Þ would it be willing to go to
achieve this objective? In the next subsection we consider Cournot competition
between firms that differ in marginal costs and consider the possibility that the
less efficient firm can raise fixed costs to exclude its more efficient rival.
Finally, in the last subsection we allow firm 1 to have a first-mover advantage
in its output decision.
Denote the monopoly level of output as qm. Standard conditions ensure that
2qc > qm > qc, i.e. industry output is higher with two active firms than with a
monopoly. Define the level of fixed costs above which the best reply to the
monopoly output level by a rival is not to produce and hence avoid the fixed
costs as
~F  pi qi qmð Þ; qm
 
For low levels of fixed costs, 0 F ~F, the Cournot equilibrium is the unique
equilibrium, whereas for ~F F F (where F is the level of fixed costs above
which no firm is profitable) there exists a q0 2 qc; qm½  such that F ¼ pi qi q0ð Þ; q0
 
.
Therefore, for all q 2 q0; qm½  the best reply to q is to produce nothing. The best
reply to the rival producing nothing is then qm.
As suggested earlier, since quantities are strategic substitutes under
Cournot competition, it must be the case that ~F (see Appendix 3 for a formal
demonstration). Furthermore, it follows from Proposition 1 that raising fixed
costs to ~F F will be profitable.
The intuition can be explained using a best reply diagram. Figure 1
illustrates the case where fixed costs are such that ~F and therefore when firm i
produces above q0, where q0\qm, firm j’s best reply is to produce nothing.
There are then three possible equilibria: two where only one firm is active and
one in which both firm 1 and 2 are active (however, forward induction results
in a unique prediction of only firm 1 being active, see note 4).
Figure 1. Best reply diagram for ~F\F\F^ð2Þ.
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Starting out with the set of equilibria shown in Figure 1, if the fixed costs
were increased sufficiently, it is clear that eventually (above F^ð2Þ) the Cournot
equilibrium would fail to exist.
Now consider how far above F^ð2Þ firm 1 would be willing to go to exclude
firm 2. From earlier, there exists a level of fixed costs F  pi qm; 0ð Þ  pi qc; qcð Þ
such that, for F, firm i prefers the monopoly equilibrium with positive fixed
costs and qi ¼ qm to the Cournot equilibrium with zero fixed costs. On the
other hand, for F, firm i prefers the Cournot equilibrium with baseline fixed
costs to the monopoly equilibrium with fixed costs raised and qi ¼ qm. Here,
even being a monopolist does not compensate firm 1 for the cost increase.
Bringing together the analysis in this section, the following proposition
outlines the complete range of fixed cost levels for which firm 1 can profitably
exclude firm 2.
Proposition 2. If firm 1 can raise fixed costs such that ~F F\F (where
~F\F^ð2Þ and F\F) it will be able to profitably exclude firm 2.
4.3. Excluding a More Efficient Firm
In the previous analysis we assumed that, apart from their ability to raise fixed
costs, firms were otherwise identical. It is evident that our results hold if the
firm that can take the action to raise fixed costs also has a marginal cost
advantage; however, recent policy concerns in the EU have centred around the
exclusion of a firm which is at least an “as-efficient competitor”, see for
example Vickers (2005). In Appendix 4 we show in a Cournot duopoly setting
with linear demand that a firm with a marginal cost disadvantage can exclude
a more efficient rival as long as the degree of cost asymmetry is not too large.
Thus, a more efficient firm being excluded from the market is a second source
of inefficiency that could arise from a fixed-cost-raising strategy.
4.4. First-Mover Advantage in the Product Market
In all of the above analysis we have assumed that firms make their pricing or
output decisions simultaneously. We now relax this and allow firm 1 to be a
Stackelberg leader in its output decision. Following the earlier analysis, here it
will remain the case that firm 1 will be able to exclude firm 2 by raising F
above ~F exactly as defined in the previous subsection on symmetric duopoly
Cournot competition;5 however, the difference now is in how far above this
level firm 1 would be willing to raise F to exclude firm 2. There now exists a
level of fixed costs F  p1 qm; 0ð Þ  p1 qm; qðqmÞð Þ such that for F firm 1
prefers the Stackelberg equilibrium with baseline fixed costs to the monopoly
equilibrium with fixed costs raised and q1 ¼ qm. Note that the standard result
that firm 1s profits are higher as a Stackelberg leader ensures that F is lower
than F, as defined in the subsection on symmetric duopoly Cournot
competition. This means that under Stackelberg competition the range of
fixed costs for which firm 1 can exclude firm 2 is narrower than that in
Proposition 2 under Cournot competition with simultaneous output decisions.
In the former, firm 1 has higher profits in the status quo and so is less willing
to push up fixed costs to exclude a rival. On the other hand, this alternative
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source of asymmetry also means that it is no longer necessary that firm 1 alone
has the ability to raise fixed costs. Furthermore, once it has a first-mover
advantage in the product market, firm 1 has no need to communicate its
intention in the competition subgame. Hence, here there is no need to rely on
the forward induction argument to support a credible fixed-cost-raising
strategy.
5. Conclusion
This article has argued that across many sectors there is a wide range of
avenues by which a well placed firm can potentially raise rivals’ fixed costs.
We then demonstrated that it can be a profitable strategy for such a firm to
exclude its rivals even if its fixed costs are affected as much (or even more)
than those excluded and even if it is less efficient. Strategies which “merely”
increase fixed costs can therefore harm economic welfare and should not be
dismissed from competition and regulatory authority scrutiny. Moreover, this
insight generalises to cases where both fixed and variable costs are raised and
cautions competition agencies against ignoring the implications of the first of
these effects. Raising rivals’ fixed costs may also be more durable because it is
more likely to lead to an exit and to alter entry conditions permanently.
In Appendix 1 we also provide an indication of the type of sectors where
we should be particularly concerned about harm due to fixed-cost-raising
strategies. Returning to the specific examples discussed, we can point to
several further policy implications arising from this article. Firstly, firms really
do have an incentive to gold-plate regulation and regulatory procedures, and
an incentive for incumbent firms to remove so-called red tape of regulators
and governments may not exist. This has important implications for the
procedures regulators and governments use for consulting about reforms. As
suggested by the Office of Fair Trading (2002), regulation can have an adverse
effect on competition in certain scenarios and therefore policy makers should
consider this impact on the industry. Regulatory impact assessments should be
alert to the possibility that firms may be appearing to argue against their own
narrow best interests not because they are public spirited, but because this can
confer a benefit to them by reducing the number of competitors. Such concerns
are particularly relevant in situations where close connections with the firms
make the regulator prone to regulatory capture and thus likely to act in the
best interest of firms rather than consumers.
Secondly, courts and authorities should be alert to the possibility that
vexatious litigation can amount to an abuse of dominance and hence be caught
by competition law. Moreover, competition agencies should in particular be
alert to allegations about abusive threats of intellectual property litigation that
arise from horizontal rivals. Thirdly, with respect to the examples where the
fixed costs of essential inputs are raised, the main message in this paper is that
even if many of these strategies do not affect marginal costs they can still have
significant anti-competitive effects.
Finally, this paper has focused on the strategic increase in fixed costs to
deter entry or force a rival to exit the industry; however, as suggested by
Durham et al. (2004), there is at least one possible alternative motive for a
“raising fixed costs” strategy which is worth noting and may provide avenues
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for further research. If at least part of the fixed costs is sunk, then firms may
prefer to stay in the industry and make losses rather than immediately exit the
industry. However, a change in industry conduct, i.e. a move towards more
collusive behaviour would potentially allow all firms to continue to make
positive profits. Therefore, the motive for raising industry wide fixed costs
could be to change conduct in the industry rather than to attempt to exclude.
This is similar to the rationale for RRC in Mason (2002) where it is shown in a
dynamic setting that a symmetric increase in variable costs can be profitable
for all firms if it leads to a reduction in the intensity of competition.
Furthermore, an experiment conducted by Durham et al. (2004) found
evidence that, when large fixed costs were present, price signalling behaviour
took place in an attempt to reduce competition and enable firms to remain
profitable.
Notes
1. Consistent with the examples described below, we focus on fixed costs that are avoidable for
any firm that decides not to produce. This is in contrast to the stream of literature initiated by
Sutton (1991) which examines how the escalation of sunk costs affects market concentration.
2. In general, except in the specific case of homogeneous product Bertrand competition (see the
section on Bertrand competition with homogenous products), F ¼ 0 provides a very different
result to Proposition 1. Namely, that for n > 2 it is then never worthwhile to raise rivals’ fixed
costs. The intuition for this result follows from the fact that with free entry there is nothing
restricting the number of firms. For any given initial finite n, any firm contemplating raising
fixed costs to reduce the number of firms to n 1 is essentially doing it not from n but from an
infinitely larger number. Even though the profit of each firm is very small when n is very large,
so is the incremental increase in profits from reducing the number of firms by one. This result
only occurs in the limit when there is room for infinitely many firms.
3. For the use of forward induction for this purpose, see for example Bagwell and Ramey (1996).
4. Note that here, there will still be an equilibrium in which firm 1 takes the action to raise fixed
costs and si ¼ si ðnÞ8i; however, using forward induction, if firm 1 intended to choose s1ðnÞ it
never makes any sense for firm 1 to raise fixed costs. Thus, observing raised fixed costs, firm
1’s rivals must rule out s1 ¼ s1ðnÞ.
5. This is the blockaded entry case described in model by Dixit (1979) of entry barriers under
Stackelberg competition. He also describes how entry can be deterred at lower levels of fixed
costs under the assumption of the Sylos postulate, where the leader can commit to a given
level of output regardless of whether or not entry occurs.
6. The comment by Sawyer (2001) also suggests that their results are applicable beyond NAFTA.
7. The broader organisational literature on corporate political activity is summarised in Hillman,
Keim, and Keim (2004) and Shaffer (1995). These surveys demonstrate that firms spend
substantial resources on political lobbying activities and that this is not just restricted to the US,
but extends to many other countries (see Hillman, Keim, and Keim, 2004, 838).
8. These are sometimes known as spurious litigation, nuisance suits or sham suits.
9. See Gavil, Kovacic and Baker (2008, 1081) for a summary of important past US cases.
10. Where each party pays their own legal costs irrespective of the outcome (e.g. the US), there is
clearly more scope to RRC than where the loser pays (e.g. most EU member states).
11. See Bloom, Gundlach and Cannon (2000) for an overview.
12. Land banks held by major grocery chains were one of the issues considered in the 2006 UK
Competition Commission market inquiry into the groceries market. See http://webarchive.
nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140402141250/www.competition-commission.org.uk/our-work/direc
tory-of-all-inquiries/groceries-market-investigation-and-remittal/final-report-and-appendices-
glossary-inquiry.
13. Similar effects can arise in connection with other kinds of deception such as the creation and
marketing of a ”version of software that is not cross-platform compatible. The costs of
correcting unexpected compatibility problems are almost entirely fixed.
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Appendix 1. Ways of Raising Fixed Costs
Here we will outline a range of strategies that a firm which is well placed, due to the reasons
outlined in the section on the set-up and assumptions, could adopt to raise all of the firms’ fixed
costs. The order in which these strategies will be introduced matches their ability to also raise
variable costs, ranging from the most to the least likely.
Costly Rules and Regulations
There is an extensive and well established literature on lobbying for regulation; see, for example,
McWilliams, Van Fleet, and Cory (2002) for a large number of examples of regulation which
increases rivals’ costs and Shaffer (1995) for a more general survey of the interaction between firms
and governments when it comes to regulation.
While typically seen as a means of raising variable costs through increased tariffs, some costs
related to trade policy can be fixed. For example, Depken and Ford (1999) consider the costs of
obtaining a tariff reduction for firms trading within the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA).6 They model firms as facing a trade-off between incurring high fixed application costs to
obtain a tariff and a marginal cost reduction or accepting the high tariff and consequently having
high marginal but low fixed costs; however, clearly exiting the market is also an option. Consider
the case where a firm is not viable without the tariff reduction; in this case rivals successfully
lobbying for an increase in the fixed application costs can leave exiting as the only viable strategy
for this firm.
Another example arises from increases in the compliance costs. Such costs are typically
independent of output levels and hence represent a genuine increase in fixed costs. Many different
forms of regulation impose significant compliance costs on firms competing within, or considering
entering, an industry. 7 For example, Bartel and Thomas (1987) show how both the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration and the Environmental Protection Agency have been used as
means to predate by RRC.
Vexatious Litigation
Litigation with the primary aim of disadvantaging the defendant rather than to right a wrong
offers an alternative way of raising a rival’s fixed costs. Most jurisdictions recognise that a
dominant firm could abuse its position through vexatious litigation8 and hence allow a victim’s
claims to be brought before the courts, but courts are reluctant to allow such cases because firms
and individuals have a fundamental right of access to a judge.9 Although it may be possible for a
victim of this form of RRC to defeat it in court, establishing that the litigation is truly vexatious is
clearly very demanding. Hence vexatious litigation remains a plausible strategy to raise a rival’s
fixed costs.
While the success of this strategy depends to some extent on cost allocation rules, at best only
the direct costs of litigation can be shifted to the losing party.10 These may be a relatively small
part of the full opportunity cost of defending a case. Additional costs such as court fees, expert
advise and the opportunity costs of the officers and other staff of the company tied up in the court
proceedings are typically not recoverable and are almost invariably fixed. Hence, even in
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jurisdictions with a loser pays policy, vexatious litigation may still be able to raise costs
significantly.
This form of behaviour is more likely to be a problem in industries in which intellectual
property rights are particularly important, for example the pharmaceutical and biotechnology
industries, because in these industries threats of action and action against infringement are often
observed. There is also some evidence that firms in their patenting decisions may plan both
offensively and defensively for vexatious litigation. Work on patent thickets suggests that a firm’s
patenting behaviour may be influenced by future litigation possibilities aimed at RRC (see, for
example, Rubinfeld and Maness, 2005). Defensively, Lerner (1995) shows that firms with high
litigation costs try to avoid patenting in areas where there are rivals and in particular where rivals
with low-litigation costs have previously patented.
Specialised Inputs
As discussed earlier, a long-standing example of an RRC strategy is paying inflated wages to
workers (Williamson, 1968). In a case brought in the 1960s against Pennington, a US mining firm, it
was alleged that they had used a wage agreed with the labour union in order to RRC. The strategy
of inflating wages at one firm would clearly not work if there was a ready supply of workers
willing to take on work for rivals at non-inflated wages. Thus, the supply of workers has to be
restricted. This could occur for a variety of reasons, for example because a particular skill is
required. An obvious example of this would be sports stars, where the effect of one team paying
inflated salaries is likely to be that others would have to match or lose players; however, in this
case we also observe key players locked in through long-term contracts, making such key workers
more of a fixed cost. While long-term labour contracts are unusual, long-term relationships through
implicit contracts may be less so, especially with key personnel. For example, Prendergast (1998)
points out that many of the incentive mechanisms used by firms require a long-term relationship
between the firm and the worker. More directly, many incentive schemes for managers include
fixed elements. The extent to which a firm could really hurt a rival by strategically over-paying
workers is an unresolved empirical matter; however, where it is possible, at least part of the cost
increase is likely to be in fixed costs. The next category describes a number of other scenarios
where it is clear that essential inputs are have a fixed and limited supply.
Competition for Capacity
With the number of products available outstripping the space on supermarket shelves, competition
for scarce shelf-space has increased. This scarcity has induced manufacturers to pay retailers
slotting allowances, that is lump-sum payments, to secure their share of available shelf space. It is
well recognised in the literature that the competition for space can lead to anti-competitive effects
11 and in particular that slotting allowances can be used as an RRC strategy. In Shaffer (2005, 3),
“Slotting allowances raise rivals’ costs because they are the means by which the dominant firm
bids up the price of an essential input (the retailers’ shelf space)”. Furthermore, it is shown that the
incentive to induce exclusion through slotting allowance is greater the closer substitutes products
are, i.e. the more valuable the exclusion is.
While one could argue that these strategies should be grouped with the previous section, the
benefit of keeping them separate is twofold. Firstly, the strategy solely affects fixed, not variable,
costs. Secondly, it highlights sectors (e.g. large format retailing) for which the strategy is
particularly relevant. As with slotting allowances, in such sectors the holding of land banks of sites
in particularly well suited to locations which will raise the cost of entry or expansion of rival
retailers.12 In addition, there will also be many other sectors where key inputs are a fixed cost and
are also in short supply, for example the spectrum for mobile broadband provision.
Advertising to Blur the Message
There are cases where advertising can be used strategically to blur the message, either by blocking
the message space, much like a slotting allowance with respect to physical space, or by drowning
out the message of a rival.13
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An example of the first type of strategy can be found in Tharp (1989–1990) who shows that the
“Calendar Marketing Agreements” (CMA), used for example by Pepsi and Coca-cola in the US, to
secure exclusive promotional services can RRC. The CMA works much like a slotting allowance in
that it crowds out other retailers, although it possibly goes one step further by securing exclusivity
for the retailer’s advertising during specified periods.
The idea that the advertising of others creates “noise” in the market goes back to at least
Comanor and Wilson (1974). Where one firm’s advertising reduces the effectiveness of a rival’s
message, it is clear that a dominant firm by raising its expenditure on advertising can force others
to either do the same or to exit. An example of this emerges from the US coffee market. Hilke and
Nelson (1984, 1989) provide evidence that the dominant player, Maxwell House, used such a
strategy when facing entry by another coffee maker, Folgers. A particularly interesting aspect of
their strategy was that they chose their advertising to be as close to the entrants campaign as
possible, thereby hoping to create confusion between the two brands, something which was likely
to harm the incumbent the least.
Summary of the Cost Raising Strategies
The fixed costs referred to in this section have all been avoidable for a firm that exits the market
and hence all have the capacity to exclude rivals. Furthermore, the strategies could be employed in
a range of sectors, ensuring their economic relevance. Regulation is particularly relevant in
industries where health and safety or environmental concerns are important. Vexations regulation
is often linked to the use of intellectual property protection and hence relates particularly to the
pharmaceutical industry and other heavy users of patent protection. Raising the costs of specialised
inputs is particularly relevant in sports, but can also be expected in industries where talent is key,
such as software development. Slotting allowances are particularly found in large format retailing
such as supermarkets. Finally, some of the advertising strategies affect manufacturers of
convenience goods.
Appendix 2. Bertrand Model with Differentiated Products
To consider the effect on the number of firms and hence the number of products in a differentiated
goods oligopoly, the derived demand function must allow for the number of variants to vary.
Consider the following quadratic utility function where the consumer has a preference for
diversity:
U q0; qi; i 2 1; :::;Nf gð Þ ¼ K þ a
XN
i¼1 qi 
b
2
XN
i¼1 q
2
i 
c
2
XN
i¼1
XN
j 6¼i qiqj þ q0;
(2.1)
where b c, q0 is the composite outside good and qi is the ith variant. Maximising (2.1) subject to a
budget constraint yields the following set of linear demand functions:
qi ¼ 1bþ c N  1ð Þ a
bþ c N  2ð Þ
b cð Þ pi þ
c
b cð Þ
XN
j 6¼i pj
 
; i 2 ½1;N:
Normalising marginal costs to zero, we can find the equilibrium price levels and hence the
equilibrium profit as a function of the number of firms N:
p Nð Þ ¼ a2 b cð Þ bþ c N  2ð Þð ÞðcðN  3Þ þ 2bÞ2ðbþ cðN  1ÞÞ  F: (2.2)
The key question is whether this per-firm profit function is convex in the number of firms.
Differentiate (2.2) twice to obtain
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@2p
@N2
¼ 2a
2c2 b cð Þ
b cþNcð Þ3 2b 3cþNcð Þ4W;
where
W ¼ 1þ N  2ð Þ 11 9N þ 3N2  c3 þ 37 34N þ 9N2 bc2
þ 9N  18½ b2cþ 3b 2c½ b2:
As each term in square brackets is positive for N 2, it follows that here ð@2pÞ=ð@N2Þ > 0. Hence,
per-firm profits are convex in the number of firms so that the sufficient condition in Proposition 1
holds.
Appendix 3. Proof that ~F\F^ for a Cournot Duopoly
The best reply of firm i to qj is given by the solution to
@pi qi; qj
 
@qi
¼ 0:
Consider the profit of firm i along its best reply function and note that this is decreasing in qj
because
@pi qi qj
 
; qj
 
@qj
¼ @pi qi; qj
 
@qi
dqi qj
 
dqj
þ @pi qi; qj
 
@qj
¼ @pi qi; qj
 
@qj
\0:
Since qm > qc it follows that pðqi ðqmÞ; qmÞ.
Appendix 4. Profitable Fixed Cost Raising by a Less Efficient Firm
Consider Cournot competition between firms 1 and 2 with marginal production costs c1 > c2 and
where as before only firm 1 can take an action to raise fixed costs. Assume inverse demand is
given by
p ¼ a bQ;
where Q ¼ q1 þ q2 and a > c1. Standard computations yield the following profits for the Cournot
equilibrium:
piðqci ; qcj Þ ¼
ða 2ci þ cjÞ2
9b
: (4.1)
Alternatively, if firm i is a monopolist its profit are given by
piðqmi ; 0Þ ¼
ða ciÞ2
4b
: (4.2)
Following the earlier analysis, firm 1 will be willing to raise fixed costs to exclude firm 2 as long as
F. A sufficient condition for firm 1 to be willing (as in the section on symmetric duopoly Cournot
competition) to raise fixed costs beyond the level at which the duopoly is no longer viable is that
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p1ðqm1 ; 0Þ[ p1ðqc1; qc2Þ þ p2ðqc1; qc2Þ: (4.3)
To consider the impact marginal cost asymmetry has on the condition in (4.3), we can increase
asymmetry holding average industry costs constant, i.e. ðc1 þ c2Þ=2  c and therefore c2 ¼ 2c c1.
Then, using (4.1),
p1ðqc1; qc2Þ þ p2ðqc1; qc2Þ ¼
ðaþ 2c 3c1Þ2 þ ðaþ 3c1  4cÞ2
9b
: (4.4)
Using (4.2) and (4.4) it can then be shown that (4.3) holds as long as
c1 þ 20ðc1  cÞ\a: (4.5)
This condition is clearly satisfied in the symmetric case where c1 ¼ c. Furthermore, as the left-hand
side of (4.5) is increasing in c1, there exists a level of c1 > c such that (4.5) holds with equality.
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